To answer this question leads back to the conception of the position of the child in society. In,pre-industrial Europe, the child's horizons were largely limited by his family. jlis father's station in life .was overwhelmingly likely to be. his own. Zf his father were a serf, he would likely .become one as well; if his father were. a shoemaker, he would likely:,become a shoemaker. But even this immobility was not the crux of the matter: he was a part of the family production enterprise, and would likely .remain within this enterprise throughout his life.
The extended family, as the basic unit of social organization, had complete authority over the.child. (and very ,nearly, complete .authority over all its members), and complete responsibility for him. This responsibility ordinarily did not end when the child became an adult, because he remained a part. of the.same economic unit, merely perpetuating it into the next generation. There was certainlysome mobility out of the family, but the general pattern was family continuity through a patriarchal kinship system..
There are two elements .of critical importance, here. The first is that the family carried responsibility,for,its members' welfare from cradle to grave.
It was a "welfare society" with the extended:families as welfare organizations for their own members. Thus it was to the family's interest 2 to see that its members became productive. Conversely, it was of relatively small interest whether someone in another family became productive or notmerely because the mobility of productive labor between family economic units was relatively low. If the son of a neighbor was allowed to become a neler do well, it had little real effect on the family itself.
The second important element is that the family, as a unit of economic production, provided an appropriate context where the child could learn the things he needed to know. The craftsman's shop or the farmer's fields were appropriate training grounds for sons, and the household was an appro.
priate training ground for daughters.
In this kind of society, the concept of equality of educational opportunity had no relevance at all. The child and adult were embedded within the extended family and the child's education or training was merely that necessary to maintain the family's produ?tivity. The fixed stations in life which most families occupied precluded any general ideas of "opportunity,"
and even less equality of opportunity. It is important also to note that this social structure did not disappear everywhere at once -and in particular, that Negroes in the rural south have been under such conditions until the present generation. Until mobility to urban areas became great most
Negroes remained under an essentially feudal social structure, with a fixed station in life for the family, in which education, beyond that gained on the farm, was irrelevant.
With the industrial revolution, changes occurred in both the family's function as a self-perpetuating economic unit, and as a training ground. As there arose economic organizations outside the household, children began to be occupationally mobile, outside their family. As'families lost their economic production activities, they began also to lose their welfare functions, and the poor or ill or incapacitated became more nearly a community responsibility.
Thus the training which a child recieved began to be of interest to all in the community, either as his potential employers or as his potential economic support* if he became dependent. In 18th century
England, during this stage of development, communities had laws preventing immigration from another community, because of the potential economic burden of immigrants.
Secondly, as some men came to employ their own labor outside the family, in these new factories, their families became less useful economic training grounds for their children.
This fundamental change in social structure paved the way for public education. Families needed a context withIn which their children could learn some general skills that would be useful for gaining work outside their family; and men of influence in the community began to be interested in the potential productivity of other men's children.
It was in the early 19th century that the foundations of public education began in Europe and America. Before that time, there had been a strong development of private education in the classes most affected by the industrial revolutipn or by commerce. These families had both the need and resources to have their children educated outside the home, either for professional occupations or for occupations in the developing world of commerce. But the idea of general educational opportunity for children arose only in the 19th century.
The time at which public, tax-supported education began was, however, not solely a function pf the stage of industrial development. It was also a function of the class structure in the society. In the United States, without a strong and traditional class structure, publicly-supported free schools began in the early 19th century, while in England, the "voluntary schools," run and organized by churches, were not supplemented by a state- ..
as well, the absence of educational opportunity for Negroes in the South arose from the caste and feudal structure of the largely rural society.
One could express the idea of differentiated educational opportunity provided in England by the 1870 act as deriving from a dual need: the needs, arising from industrialization, for a basic education for the labor force, and the interests in having one's own child receive a good education. The middle classes could implement both these aims by providing a free system for the children of laboring classes, and a tuition system (which soon came to be supplemented by state grants) for their own. The long survival of this differentiated system depended not only on the historical fact that the voluntary schools ez-isted before a public system came into existence, but on the fact that it allows both of these needs to be met: the community's collective need for a trained labor force, and the middle class individual's need for a better education for his own child. It serves a third need as well: that of maintaining the existing social order -a system -f stratification that was a step removed from a feudal system of fixed estates, but was designed to prevent a wholesale challenge by the children of the working class to the positions held for children of the middle classes.
The similarity of this system to that which existed in the South to provide differential opportunity to Negroes and whites is striking, just as the similarity of class structure in the second half of the 19th century
England to the white-Negro caste structure of the Southern United States in the first half of the 20th century.
In the United States, from the beginning, the concept of educational opportunity (for whites) was a concept of eguality, of opportunity. Both the absence of a legitimate class structure in the United States, and the need to provide a common integrating experience, a "melting pot," for 5 immigrants from diverse backgrounds, led away from a differentiated system, and toward a common school.
But the concept of equality of educational cpportunity held then was itself a special concept. Equality of opportunity meant several things:
1.
Providing a free education up to a given level which constituted the principal entry point to the labor force.
2.
Providing a common curriculum for all children, regardless of background.
3.
Partly by design and partly because of low population density, providing that children from diverse backgrounds attend the same school.
4.
Providing equality within a given locality, since local taxes provided the source of support for schools.
This conception of equality of opportunity is that which is still held by many persons; but there are some assumptions in it which are not obvious.
First, it implicitly assumes that the existence of free schools eliminates economic sources of inequality of opportunity. But free schools do not mean that the costs of a child's education become reduced to zero for families at all economic levels. When free education was introduced, many families could not afford it beyond an early age of the child. His labor was necessary to the family -whether in rural or urban areas. Even after the passage of child labor laws, this remained true on the farm. Thesi economic sources of inequality of opportunity have become small indeed (up through secondary education); but at one time, they were a major source of inequality, and in some countries, they remain so; and certainly, for higher education, they remain so.
Apart from economic needs of the family, the social structure was such as to raise even more fundamental questions about equality of educational opportunity. Continued school attendance prevented a boy's being trained in his father's trade. Thus taking advantage of the "equal educational 6 opportunity" excluded the son of a craftsman or small tradesmen from opportunity for those occupations he would most likely fill in any case. The family inheritance of occupation at all social levels was still strong enough, and the age of entry into the labor force was still early encoigh, that secondary education interfered with opportunity for working class children; while it opened up opportunities at higher social levels, it closed them at lower ones.
Again, there remain residues of this social structure in present American society, so that the dilemma cannot be totally ignored. The idea of a common educational experience implies that this experience has only the effect of widening the range of opportunity, never the effect of excluding opportunities. But it is clear that this is never precisely true, so long as this experience prevents a child from pursuing certain A second assumption implied by this concept of equality of opportunity is that opportunity lay in exposure to a given curriculum. The amount of opportunity is then measured in terms of the level of curriculum to which the child is exposed. The higher the curriculum made available to a given set of children, the greater their opportunity.
The most interesting point about both these assumptions is the relatively passive role of the school and community, relative to the child's role. The school's obligation was to "provide an opportunity" by being available, within easy geographic access of the child, free of cost (beyond the value of the child's time), and with a curriculum that would not exclude him from higher education. The obligation to "use the opportunity" was on the child or t1-.
family, so that his role was defined to be the active one, with Cl responsibility for achievement upon him. Despite the fact that the school's role was the relatively passive one and the child's or family's role the active one, the use of this social service soon came to be no longer a choice of the parent or child, but that of the state, through passage of compulsory attendance laws. These laws began in the 19th century, and have been periodically revised upward in age.
This concept of equality of educational opportunity is one that has been implicit in most educational practice throughout most of the period of public education in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, there have been several challenges to it, serious questions raised by new conditions in public education. The first of these in the United States was a challenge to assumption 2, the common of curriculum, and it occurred in the early years of the 20th century with the expansion of secondary education. Until the report of the committee of the National Education Association issued in 1918, the standard curriculum in secondary schools had been a classical one, college preparatory, appropriate for the college entrance which lay ahead of most of the school's graduates. But then as there came a massive influx of noncollege bound adolescents into the high school, this curriculum changed into one appropriate for the new majority. This is not to say it changed immedia',:ely in any schools, nor that all schools changed equally, but rather that the seven cardinal principles became a powerful influence in the movement toward a lees academically rigid curriculum. The introduction of the new non-classical curriculum was seldom if ever couched in terms of a conflict between those for whom high school was college preparation, and those for 8 9 whom it was terminal education; nevertheless, this is what it was. The "inequality" was the use of a curriculum that served a minority and was not designed to fit the needs of the majority; and the shift of curriculum was intended to fit the curriculum to the needs of the new majority in the schools.
This took, in many schools, the form of diversifying the curriculum, rather than supplanting one by another; the college preparatory curriculum remained, though watered down. Thus the kind of equality of opportunity that emerged from the newly-desigped secondary school curriculum is one radically different from the elementary-school concept that had emerged earlier.
Here the idea appears to have been to take as given the diverse occupational paths into which adolescents will go after secondary school, and to say (implictly): there is greater equality of educational opportunity for a boy who is not going to attend college if he has a special-designed curriculum than if he must take a curriculum designed for college entrances
There is only one difficulty with this definition: it takes as given what should be problematic: that a given boy is going into a given occupational path, or going to attend college or not. It is one thing to take as given that approximately 607. of an entering high school freshman class will not attend college; but to assign a particular child to a curriculum designed for that 60% closes off for that child the opportunity to attend college.
Yet to assign all children to a curriculum designed for the 40% who will attend college creates inequality for those who, at the end of high school, fall among the 60% who do not attend college. This is a true dilemma, and one which no educational system has fully solved. It is more general than the college-non-college dichotomy, for there is a wide variety of different paths that adolescents take on the completion of secondary school. In
England, for example, a student planning to attend a university must specialize in the arts or the sciences in the later years of secondary school.
Similar specialization occurs in the German gymnasium; and this is wholly within the group. planning to attend university. A wider range specialization can be found among non-college curricula, especially in the vocational technical and commercial high schools.
The distinguishing characteristic of this concept of equality of if there were a virtual absence of social mobility, with everyone, occupying a fixed estate in life, then such curricula that take the future as given would provide equality of opportunity relative to that structure..
It is only because of the high degree of occupational mobility between generations -that is, the greater degree of equality of occupational opportunity -that the dilemma arises.
The next stage in the evolution of the idea of equality of educational opportunity came as a result of challenges to the basic concept from opposing directions: The Southern states in the United States, in the face of Negro demands for equality of opportunity, devised the concept of "separate but equal." And the Supreme Court countered this with the .doctrine that legal separation by race inherently constitutes inequality of opportunity. Thus the Southern states challenged assumption 3 of the original concept, the assumption that equality depended on the opportunity to attend the same school. This challenge was, however,
; 10 consistent with the overall logic of the original concept, for the idea of attendance at the same school was not really part of the logic. The logic, or inherent idea, was that opportunity resided in exposure to a curriculum, and the community's -responsibility was to provide that exposure, the child's to take advantage of it.
It was the pervasiveness of this underlying idea which created the difficulty for the Supreme Court, It was evident that even when identical facilities and identical teacher Salaries existed for racially separate schools, "equality of educational opportunity" in some sense did not exist.
This had also long been evident to Englishmen as well, in a different context, for with the simultaneous existence of the "common school" and the "voluntary school," no one was under the illusion that full equality of educational opportunity had existed. But the source of thi3 inequality remained an unarticulated feeling. In the decision of the Supreme Court, this unarticulated feeling began to take form. The essence of it was that the effects of such separate schools were, or were likely to be, different.
This the concept of equality of opportunity which focussed on effects of schooling began to take form. The actual decision of the court was in fact a confusion of two unrelated premises: this new concept, which looked at results of schooling, and the legal premise that the use of race as a basis for school assignment violates fundamental freedoms. But what is important for the evolution of this concept of equality of opportunity is that a new and different assumption was introduced -the assumption that equality of opportunity depends in some fashion upon effects of schooling.
I believe the decision would have been more soundly based had it not depended on the effects of schooling; but only on the violation of freedom; but by so doing it brought into the open the implicit goals of equality of educational opportunity -that is, goals having to do with the results of 12 school -to which the original concept was somewhat awkwardly directed. That these goals were in fact behind the concept-can be verified by a simple mental experiment: suppose the early schools had operated for only one hour a week, attended by children of all social classes. This would have met the explicit assumptions of the early concept of equality of opportunity, since the school is free, with a common curriculum, and attended by all children in the locality.
But it obviously would not have been accepted, even at that time, as providing equality of opportunity, because its effects would have been so minimal. The As a consequence, in planning the survey, it was obvious that no single concept of equality of educational opportunity existed; and that the survey must give information relevant to a variety of different concepts. The basis on which this was done can be seen by reproducing a portion of an internal memorandum that determined the design of the survey:
"The point of(second importance in design zecond to the point of discovering the intent of Congress, which was taken to be that the survey was not for the purpose of locating willful discrimination, but to determine educational inequality without regard to intention of those in authority follows from the first and concerns the definition of inequality. One type of inequality may be defined in terms of differences of the community's input to the school, such as per pupil expenditure, school plants, libraries, quality of teachers, and other similar quantities.
A second type of inequality may be defined in terms of the racial composition of the school, following the Supreme Court's decision that segregated schooling is inherently inequal. By the former definition, the question of inequality through segregation is excluded, while by the latter, there is inequality of education within a school system so long as the schools within the system have different racial composition.
14 A third type of inequality would include various intangible characteristics of the school as well as the factors directly traceable to the community inputs to the school. These intangibles are such things as teacher morale, teachers' expectations of students, level of interest of the student body in learning, or others. Any of these factors may affect the impact of the school upon a given student within it. Yet such a definition gives no suggestion of where to stop, or just how relevant these factors might be for school quality.
Consequently, a fourth type of inequality may be defined in terms of consequences of the school for individuals with equal backgrounds and abilities. In this definition, equality of educational opportunity is equality of results, given the same individual input. With such a definition, inequality might come about from differences in the school inputs and/or racial composition and/or from more intangible things as described above.
Such a definition obviously would require that two steps be taken in the determination of inequality. First, it is necessary to determine the effect of these various factors upon educational results (conceiving of results quite broadly, including not only achievement but attitudes toward learning, self-image, and perhaps other variables). This provides various measures of the school's quality in terms of its effects upon its students.
Second, it is necessary to take these measures of quality, once determined, and determine the differential exposure of Negroes (or other groups) and whites to schools of high and low quality.
A fifth type of inequality may be defined in terms of consequences of the school for individuals of unequal backgrounds and abilities. In this definition, equality of educational opportunity is equality of results
given different individual inputs. The most striking examples of inequality here would be children from households in which a language other than English, such as Spanish or Navaho, is spoken. Other examples would be low achieving children from homes in which there is a poverty of verbal expression or an absence of experiences which lead to conceptual facility.
Such a definition taken in the extreme would imply that educational equality is reached only when the results of schooling (achievement and attitudes) are the same for racial and religious minorities as for the dominant group. "
The basis for the design is indicated by another segment of this memorandum: "Thus, the study will focus its principal effort on the fourth definition, but will also provide information relevant to all five possible definitions. This insures the pluralism which is obviously necessary with respect to a definition of inequality. The major justification for this focus is that the results of this approach can best be translated into policy which will improve education's effects.. The results of the first two approaches (tangible inputs to the school, and segregation) can certainly be translated into policy, but there is no good evidence that these policies will improve education's effects; and while policies to implement the fifth would certainly improve education's effects, it seems hardly possible that the study could provide information that would direct such policies, Altogether, it has become evident that it is not our role to define what constitutes equality for policy-making purposes. Such a definition will be an outcome of the interplay of a variety of interests, and will certainly differ from time to time as these interests differ. It should be our role to cast light on the state of inequality defined in the variety of ways which appear reasonable at thL3 time."
The Survey, then, was conceived as a pluralistic instrument, given the variety of ideas which had some claim of the concept of equality of opportunity in education. Yet I suggest that despite the avowed intention of not adjudicating between these different ideas, it has brought a new -:,-stage in the evolution of the'conceptFor-.the ,definitions of equality for which "the survey was designed split sharply into.two.groups: The first three 'concerned input resources:: first .those brought to the school by the actions of the school adMinistrationr facilities, curriculum,-teachers;,.
second,..'those brought to'the.school.by.the.Other students, in the educational backgrounds which their presence contributed to the school; and third, :the:, intangible characteristics-such-as Pmorale" that result from'thednteraction of all these factors. The last-two-definitions concerned the effects .of schooling.*-.Thus.the dichotomy-between inputd to school and effects of sdhoo ling divided.theselive definitions.-When-the report-emerged, it-did., not give five different measares%,of equality,. one for-each,of-these !definitions;
but it did focus sharply on.:this dichotomy,-: giving in _chapter 2.information on ineqUalities of input, relevant-to definitions land 2; and in -chapter 3
;information on inequalities of results, relevant: to definitions 4,and,-5, and -also-in chapter.. 3, information .on therelation-df input to results, again relevant:to .definitions 4 and 5.
-!:,-Tholigh it is .not directly relevant to::our discussion here,.it-is interesting to note that this, examination. of the.relation of. indicates that such measurement of effects are still subject to sharp disagreement; but the crucial point is that effects of inputs have come to constitute the basis for assessment of school quality (and thus equality of opportunity), rather than the mere definition of particular inputs as being measures of quality (e.g., small classes are better than large, higher-paid teachers are better than lower-paid ones, by definition).
It would be fortunate indeed if the matter could be left to rest there;
if merely by using effects of school rather than inputs as the basis for the concept, the problem were solved. But that is not the case at all. The last comparison showing both initial difference and the greatest increase in difference over grades 142;10-peare"Ihe' best candidate for greaiestInequality.
The lirst"comparison, with*Whites'iri-thr xural South, also seems toshow inequality The unanswerability of such questions begins to give a sense of a new concept of equality of educational opportunity -because these questions concern the relative intensity of two sets of influences: those which are alike for the two groups, principally in school, and those which are different, such as those in the home or neighborhood.
If the school's influences are not only alike for the two groups, but very strong, relative to the divergent influences, then the two groups will move together. If they are very weak, then they will move apart. Or more generally, the relative intensity of the convergent school influences and the divergent out-of-school influences determines the proximity of the educational system to providing equality of educational opportunity. In this perspective, complete equality of opportunity can only be reached if all the divergent out-of-school influences vanish, a condition that would arise only in the advent of boarding schools; given the exist divergent influences, equality of opportunity can only be approached and never fully reached. The concept becomes one of degree of proximity to equality of opportunity. This proximity is determined, then, not merely by the equality of educational inputs, but by the-intensity of the school's influences, relative to the external divergent influences, That is, equality of output is not so much determined by equality of the resource inputs, but by the power of these resources in bringing about achievement.
This, then, I suggest is the place where the concept of equality of educational opportunity presently stands -an evolution that might have been anticipated a century and a half ago when the first such concepts
arose, yet one which is very different from the concept as it first 21 developed. This difference is sharpened if we examine a further implication of the current concept as I have described it. In describing the early concept, I indicated that the role of the community, and the educational institution, was a relatively passive one, that of providing a set of free public resources. The responsibility for profitable use of those resources lay with the child and his family. But the evolution of the concept has reversed these roles. The implication of the concept as I have described it above is that the responsibility to create achievement lies with the educational institution, not the child. The difference in achievement at grade 12 between the average Negro and the average white is, in effect, the degree of inequality of opportunity, and the reduction of that inequality is a responsibility of the school. This shift in responsibility follows logically from the shift of the concept of equality of opportunity from school resource inputs to effects of schooling. When that shift came about as it has in the past several years, the school's responsibility shifted from increasing its "quality" and equalizing, the distribution of this "quality" to the quality of its students' achievements. This is a notable shift, and one which should have stong consequences for the practice of education in future years.
